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A GREAT FRENCH JUDGE trulysaid that the profession of the law
was "as old as the Magistrate, as noble
as Virtue, and as necessary as Justice."
The importance of having a Bar, the
members of which are sufficiently skilled
in the principles of law and the proce-
dure of the courts, properly to advise
laymen as to their rights, and the method
of asserting or defending them, and to
represent them in judicial controversies,
I need not dwell upon. It has been the
habit in many states to regard the prac-
tice of the law as a natural right, and
one which no one of moral character can
be deprived of. Such a view of course
ignores the importance of the profession
to society and looks at its practice only
as a means of earning a living. Laymen
can readily be made to see that society
should be ,protected against the malprac-
tice of the medical profession and sur-
gery by men who know nothing of dis-
ease or the effect of medicine or the
handling of a surgical instrument. It is
therefore comparatively free from diffi-
culty to secure laws prescribing proper
educational qualifications for those hold-
ing themselves out as physicians or sur-
geons. The danger to society of the mis-
use of the power which a lawyer's pro-
fession enables him to exercise is not so,
acutely impressed upon the layman until'
he has had some experience in following-
bad advice. A legal adviser cannot ordi-
narily injure his client's bodily health,
but he can lead him into great pecuniary
loss and subject him and his family to,
(325)
HeinOnline  -- 3 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 325 1911-1915
The American Law School Review
suffering and want. The more thorough
* the general education of one who pro-
poses to be a lawyer, the more certainly
his mind will be disciplined to possess
himself of the principles of law and
properly to apply them. There is a spirit
of hostility manifested by some courts
and lawyers, and some who are not law-
yers, to the suggestion that a funda-
mental general education is necessary to
the making of a qualified member of the
legal profession. In Indiana the Consti-
tution impliedly forbids the imposition
of examination for admission to the Bar.
The argument is: "Look at Abraham
Lincoln. He never had any education of
any sort. He educated himself, and note
his greatness both as a lawyer, a states-
man, and a man." Such an argument
would do away not only with the neces-
sity for education at the Bar, but the
necessity for schools or colleges of any
kind. The question is not whether ex-
ceptional men have made themselves
learned men, educated men, and great
lawyers without the use of schools, acad-
emies, colleges or law schools, but the
question is by what means are we likely
to produce the best average members of
the profession. By what means are we
most likely to make them skilled and able
and useful in the office for which the pro-
fession is created. Certain law schools
in the country have imposed the neces-
sity for a collegiate education upon in-
tending lawyers before they shall begin
the study of their profession. In the
medical profession, schools of a similar
standard require, after the bachelor's de-
gree, a study of four years. In the law
schools a study of three years is now
generally required, and in many states
the same period has been fixed as the
necessary period of preparation for the
Bar examinations. It is said this will
exclude many worthy young men who
would aspire to the law. As the reason
of the profession for being is to serve
society, the interest of society is the
point from which we must approach the
question, and but little consideration
should be given to the welfare of those
who would like to practice law and are
not fitted to do it well. The graduates
of colleges are in number greatly more
than sufficient to supply the needs of the
clerical, the medical, and the legal pro-
fessions, and there is no danger that
there will be any dearth of lawyers of
good material because a heavier burden
of preparation is required of them. The
view that the profession exists solely as
a livelihood creates a demand for law
schools, furnishing the easiest and short-
est way for their students to acquire the
temporary information needed to pass
the required examinations. Such schools
are cramming factories, with no thought
to the broad legal education which stu-
dents should bring to the practice after
they are admitted to the Bar. They con-
fer only a smattering of the law and only
a transient familiarity with the subjects
upon which they are examined. Men
who are thus prepared may become good
lawyers, but, if they do, it will be because
of their natural mental capacity and the
education that they give themselves aft-
erwards, and not because of any basis
of legal learning they acquired in such
schools. For the good of society, the
standards of legal education ought to be
made higher and a broad collegiate edu-
cation before the study of the law should
be insisted upon as the sine qua non.
In most states the question of the ad-
mission to the Bar is given to the Su-
preme Courts. It ought to be possible,
therefore, to secure, through such good
and eminent lawyers, a proper standard
for the making of new lawyers. They
ought, of all men, to appreciate in the
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highest degree the benefit in the adminis-
tration of justice of requiring the thor-
oughest preparation for the practice of
the profession. They could impose a
standard for preliminary and fundamen-
tal education, and then for the education
in law. Such an association as this
should have more influence with them
than it ever can have through legisla-
tures or upon the people, for it is dealing
with its own. Of course the judges do
not generally prepare the questions for
examination or mark them. They dele-
gate this to a committee of lawyers.
When we find in one of the great states
of the Union a committee of examination
that imposed questions based on cases
taken from reports of its own state, some
of doubtful authority, and gave no credit
for answers which differed from the de-
cisions of the courts, however good the
reasons, we are not surprised to learn
that some of the best-prepared students
from first-class law schools were reject-
ed, and that applicants with education in
the law much less thorough were admit-
ted who pursued the course of studying
the special character of previous ques-
tions and cramming on the answers to
them from a book prepared by one of
the committee. This book shows not a
few instances in which the answers re-
quired were hardly sustained by good
authority, even in the particular state.
Some features of this bad system have
been changed. The reform should be
more radical. No court that knowingly
permits such a system to remain in vogue
can escape criticism. Examinations of
this kind commercialize the practice of
the law more than any other one. Those
who come to the Bar by a mere trick of
memory, and without thorough absorp-
tion of legal principles, are not likely to
improve the tone of the practice to which
they have succeeded by such means. I
am not, however, sufficiently familiar
with the details of state bar examina-
tions, or with the curricula of law
schools, to be able to write an informing
paper on them, and I am glad to know
that I am to be followed by one so much
better qualified to speak on this subject.
What I wish to dwell upon especially
to-day is the influence of a proper stand-
ard for admission to the Bar on another
office of lawyers than that of advising
and representing clients. We get our
judges from the Bar, and we add to the
education of our judges when they are
on the Bench by the Bar. It is the tone
of the Bar, therefore, and the ability and
learning of the Bar, that necessarily af-
fect the learning and standards of the
Bench. The influence of a great Bar to
make a great court and to secure a series
of great decisions, every one familiar
with judicial history knows.
The function of judges is to interpret
constitutions and statutes, and apply and
enforce them, and also to declare and ap-
ply that great body of customary law
known as common law which we receiv-
ed from past generations. Theoretically,
they ought to interpret the exact inten-
tion of those who established the consti-
tution, or who enacted the legislation,
and they ought to apply the common law
exactly as it came to them. But fre-
quently new conditions arise that those
who were responsible for the written law
could not have had in view, and to which
existing common-law principles have
never before been applied, and it be-
comes necessary for the court to make
new applications of both. The power
which the court thus exercises is said to
be a legislative power, and it is urged
that it ought to be left to the people.
That it is more than a mere interpreta-
tion of the legislative or popular will,
and in the case of the common law that
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it is more than a mere investigation and
declaration of traditional law, is un-
doubtedly true. But it is not the exercise
of legislative power as that phrase is
used. It is the exercise of a sound judi-
cial discretion in supplementing the pro-
visions of constitutions and laws and
custom which are necessarily incomplete
or lacking in detail essential to their
proper application especially to new facts
and situations constantly arising. Then,
too, legislation is frequently so faulty in
proper provision for contingencies which
ought to have been anticipated that courts
cannot enforce the law without supply-
ing the defects and implying legislative
intention, although every one may rec-
ognize that the legislative body never
thought anything about the operation of
the law in such cases and never had any
intention in regard to them. Neither
constitutional convention nor legislature
nor popular referendum can make con-
stitutions or laws that will fit with cer-
tainty of specification the varying phases
of the subject-matter sought to be regu-
lated, and it has been the office of courts
to do this from time immemorial. In-
deed, it is one of the highest and most
useful functions that courts have to per-
form in making a government of law
practical and uniformly just. You can
call it a legislative power if you will, but
that does not put you one bit nearer a
sufficient reason for denying the utility
and necessity of its exercise by courts.
Of all people in the world who ought
not to be heard in objection are the ad-
vocates of the initiative and referendum
as a means of legislation. Legislatures
and constitutional conventions have been
bad enough in the enactment of meas-
ures inconsistent in themselves, and full
of difficulty for those charged with their
enforcement; but now it is proposed to
leave the drafting of laws to individual
initiative, and to submit them to popular
adoption without any possibility of cor-
rection and needed amendment, after dis-
cussion which is always afforded in the
representative system. The puzzles in
legislation now presented to courts by
this new method of making laws can be
better understood by reading some of the
perspiring efforts of the Supreme Court
of Oregon. Instead of dispensing with
courts, this purer and directer Democra-
cy is going to force upon judicial tribu-
nals greater so-called legislative duties
than ever. Of course legislatures and
the people have always the power to neg-
ative the future application of any judi-
cial construction of a constitution or a
law, or any declaration of a common-law
principle, by amendment or new law.
The practical impossibility of making
laws that are universally applicable to
every case has thrown upon the courts
the duty of supplying the deficiency ei-
ther by construction of written laws or
constructive application of the common
law. This discretion of courts is guid-
ed and limited by judicial precedents.
These precedents form a body of law
called judge-made law by those who
would attack it; but it is better to have
judge-made law than no law at all. In-
deed, the curative and lubricating effect
of this kind of law is what has made our
popular governmental machinery work
so smoothly and well. I cannot refer at
length to the now much-mooted question
of the power of the courts to refuse to
recognize legislative acts which are be-
yond the permissible discretion of the
legislature in construing its own consti-
tutional authority. I can only say that
the power has been exercised for one
hundred and twenty-five years, and, un-
less the courts continue to retain it, in-
dividual rights and every interest of all
the people will come under the arbitrary
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discretion of a constantly changing plu-
rality of the electorate, to be exercised
by varying and inconsistent decisions of
successive elections.
But, however necessary it is to intrust
such discretion to the courts, we must
recognize that its existence is made the
basis for a general attack, by professed
reformers of society, upon our judicial
system, and that this attack is finding
much sympathy among the people.
There are good grounds for criticising
our present administration of justice in
the law enforcement of the criminal law
and in the high cost and lack of dispatch
in civil litigation.
These defects are not all chargeable
to the courts themselves, by any means.
The lax administration of the criminal
law is due in a marked degree to the
prevalence of maudlin sentiment among
the people and the alluring limelight in
which the criminal walks if only he can
give a little sensational coloring to his
mean or sordid offense. Then the state
legislatures, responding perhaps to a pop-
ular demand, and too often influenced by
shallow but for the time being politically
influential members of our own profes-
sion, devise every means to deprive the
court of its power at common law to con-
trol the manner of trial and to assist the
juries, but not to constrain them, to right
conclusions. Codes of procedure of im-
mense volume and exasperating detail
keep litigants "pawing in the vestibule
of justice" while the chance of doing real
justice fades away. Then, too, unneces-
sary opportunity for appeals and writs
of error and new trials is afforded by
statute, and the litigant with the longest
purse is given a great advantage. More
than this, many questions that ought to
be settled by administrative tribunals
with proper authority have been thrust
upon the courts. This has had two ef-
fects. It involves the courts in quasi-
political and economic controversies that
they ought not to be burdened with, and
that necessarily expose them to criticism
as being prejudiced. Second, it takes up
the time of the courts in executive mat-
ters and delays dispatch of legitimate ju-
dicial work. The creation of the inter-
state commerce commission, of state pub-
lic utilities commissions, of boards of
conciliation and arbitration in labor con-
troversies, of commissions for fixing
compensation for injured workmen, and
of other executive agencies for the de-
termination of issues involved in proper
governmental regulation and exercise of
the police power, are lifting much from
the courts. Then our association and
many state associations are zealously and
successfully working to induce legisla-
tures and courts by statute and rules to
simplify procedure and make it a vehicle
of quick justice at little cost.
But the lax administration of the crim-
inal law and the cost and delay of civil
litigation are not the special objects of
attack by social reformers. Their fire is
directed against what they call the legis-
lative power of the courts that I have de-
scribed. This they contend is now being
exercised to defeat measures essential to
true social progress by reactionary judg-
es. Let us trace out the reasons for this
antagonism, and perhaps in them we can
find the true solution of the difficulty so
far as there is any real substance in their
complaint.
In the Federal Constitution there were
embodied two great principles: First,
that the government should be a repre-
sentative popular government, in which
every class in society, the members of
which have intelligence to know what will
benefit them, is given a voice in selecting
the representatives who are to carry on
the government and in determining its
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general policy. On the other hand, the
same constitution exalts the personal
rights and opportunities of the individual,
and prescribes the judicial machinery for
their preservation against the infringe-
ment by the majority of the electorate in
whose hands was placed the direction of
the executive and legislative branches of
the government. The common-law rule
was followed, by which each individual
was given independence in his action so
long as that independence did not in-
fringe the independence of another.
This has given the motive for labor, in-
dustry, saving, and the sharpening of in-
tellect and skill in the production of
wealth and in its reuse as capital to in-
crease itself. The material expansion of
our country, unprecedented in history,
would have been utterly impossible with-
out it. When the constitution was adopt-
ed there was not only legal independence
of the individual, but actual independ-
ence in his method of life, because he
could and did produce almost everything
that was needed for his comfort in the
then standard of living. We have now
become a people with an immense urban
population far from the source of neces-
sary supply, and therefore we have be-
come far more dependent on each other
that life may go on and be enjoyed.
While it is undoubtedly true that the liv-
ing of the average individual is far more
comfortable than it ever was, we have
now reached a point in the progress of
our material development when we are
stopping to take breath and to make
more account of those who are behind in
the race. We are more sensitive to the
inequality of conditions that exist among
the people and the enjoyment of the
comforts of life.' We are pausing to in-
quire whether by governmental action
some changes cannot be made in the le-
gal relations between the social classes
and in the amelioration of oppressive
conditions affecting those who in the
competition between individuals under
existing institutions are receiving least
advantage from the general material ad-
vance. It is essential that our material
expansion should continue to meet the
demands of the growing population and
to increase the general comfort. Were
we to take away the selfish motive in-
volved in private property we would halt,
stagnate, and then retrograde, the aver-
age comfort and happiness in society
would be diminished, and those who are
now in want would be poorer than ever.
The trend of those who would improve
society by collectivist legislation is to-
ward increasing the functions of govern-
ment, and one of the great difficulties
they have to meet is provision for the
rapidly increasing pecuniary burden that
this entails. Municipalities and states
that have attempted something of this
kind are finding that their credit is ex-
hausted and their tax resources are not
sufficient. Whatever the changes, there-
fore, we must maintain for the sake of
society our institutional system of indi-
vidual reward, or little of the progress
so enthusiastically sought can be attain-
ed. It is not alone constitutional re-
straints that limit thoughtless, unjust,
and arbitrary popular excesses, but also
those of economic laws and the character
of human nature, and these latter work
with seemingly cruel inevitableness that
ought to carry its useful lesson home.
The social reformers contend that the
old legal justice consisted chiefly in se-
curing to each individual his rights in
property or contracts, but that the new
social justice must consider how it can
secure for each individual a standard of
living and such a share in the values of
civilization as shall make possible a full
moral life. They say that legal justice
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is the removal of all those restrictions on
the free action of an individual which are
not necessary for securing the like free-
dom on the part of his neighbors, while
social justice is the satisfaction of every
one's wants so. far as they are not out-
weighed by others' wants. The change
advocated by the social reformers is real-
ly that the object of law should be social
interests and not individual interests.
They unjustly assume that individual
rights are held inviolate in the interest of
the individual to whom such rights are
selfishly important and not because their
preservation benefits the community.
On the contrary, personal liberty, includ-
ing the right of property, is insisted up-
on because it conduces to the expansion
of material resources which are plainly
essential to the interests of society and
its progress. We must continue to main-
tain it whether our aim is individualistic
or social. As long as human nature is
constituted as it is, this will be true.
When only altruistic motives actuate
men, it may be different.
But we must recognize the strong pop-
ular interest in the sociological move-
ment and realize the importance of giv-
ing it a practical and successful issue.
We are not tied to the defects of the past
or present, and we ought to be anxious
to guide the proposed reforms so that we
shall secure all the good possible from
them without ignoring the inestimable
boon of experience we have inherited
from centuries of struggle toward better
things.
The Supreme Court of the United
States has given many evidences of its
appreciation of the changes in settled
public opinion in respect to the qualifica-
tion of individual rights by the needs of
society. Its definition or rather lack of
definition of the police power, and its
proposed method of pricking out its limi-
tations in accord with predominant pub-
lic opinion, is an example. Indeed, many
other instances of the infusion of social
ideas into the law by construction of re-
medial statutes and by adjustment of
common-law principles to cases of social
justice could be cited. It is noteworthy
that this is most evident in the highest
of our courts with judges of greatest ex-
perience, ability, and learning in funda-
mental jurisprudence and of statesman-
like constructive faculty. It is through
discriminating and far-sighted legisla-
tors and through great and learned judg-
es that we can safely and surely achieve
the social changes and reforms within
the practical range of enforceable law.
It must be remembered that with men as
they are, government and law cannot
make every change in society, however
desirable it may be. Law which is un-
enforceable or ineffective is worse than
none. There are zones in the field of
social relations in which progress can
only be made by the moral uplift of the
individual members of society, and in
which the use of legal compulsion is
worse than futile.
Nevertheless, many who are infused
with the new ideas are prone to look
askance upon what they call the individ-
ualistic system, and are quite willing to
do away with the constitutional restraints
and the teachings and influence of the
common law upon which such a system
must rest. Relying upon the willingness
of inflamed majority to possess them-
selves of advantages over a minority, or
the individual, they advocate remedies
that tend toward confiscation.
Attempts made to carry out such ideas
have, of course, startled the owners of
property and capital to measures of de-
fense and leading members of the Bar
have ranged themselves in support of
these measures. Indeed, in the enor-
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mous material development the services
of the profession have been invoked, and
often, to protect methods that were in-
defensible. The profession has suffered
from not having that independence of
clients that the English barristers enjoy,
in which the relation between the two is
temporary and but for a single cause.
Such a relation does not produce that
widespread popular impression of com-
plete identity of the professional advo-
cate and adviser with the client, especial-
ly the corporate client and all its inter-
ests and plans. For these reasons our
profession at present is under suspicion
of being subsidized by our relation to the
property of our clients, and of not being
able to discuss without prejudice the bet-
terment of present conditions in society.
Those who are advocating these reforms
propose, therefore, in the future largely
to dispense with lawyers, largely to dis-
pense with constitutional restraints, and
to place their whole confidence in the di-
rcct action of the people, not only in the
enactment of laws, not only in their exe-
cution and enforcement, but also in the
judicial function of determining justice
in individual cases. This hostility to our
profession, while it is natural and can be
explained, is unjust. We are as intelli-
gent, generous, patriotic, self-sacrificing,
and sympathetic a class as there is in so-
ciety. We are not opposed to progress,
real progress. Moreover, we know how
to do things, and in the end no success-
ful legal step forward will be made with-
out our aid and shaping. We are far
from lacking in a desire to improve so-
cial conditions. We recognize the in-
equalities existing between social classes
in our communities, and agree to the ne-
cessity of new legal conceptions of their
duties toward each other. But we have
been driven by circumstances into an at-
titude of opposition. The proposals
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made for'progress have been so radical,
so entirely a departure from all the les-
sons of the past, and so dangerous to
what we regard as essential in preserv-
ing the inestimable social advances we
have made since the Christian era, that
we have been forced to protest. The re-
sult is that at present the militant social
reformers and the lawyers are far apart.
We don't talk exactly the same language.
It is enough to answer our expressed
opinions for them to say that we think
and talk as lawyers.
What then is it necessary for us to do
in this coming crisis, for it is a crisis in
the life of courts and administration of
justice. Many of the social reformers
are oblivious of the lessons to be derived
from experience in enforcement and op-
erations of laws upon society. They do
not realize the necessity for making the
many different rules of law fit a system
that shall work. They bring to the re-
pair of a mechanism of interlocking
parts, rude and unsuitable instruments.
Nothing could more reflect upon their
crude conception of judicial procedure
than the proposition of a recall of judi-
cial decisions. Social changes are not to
be successfully made by a cataclysm, un-
less present conditions are as oppressive
as those which caused the French Revo-
lution. To be valuable they must come
slowly and with deliberation. They are
to be brought about by discriminating
legislation, proceeding on practical lines
and construed by courts having an atti-
tude of favor to the object in view.
I have spoken little to my purpose if
I have not made clear the necessity for
broadening much the qualification of the
general body of our judiciary to meet the
important and responsible requirements
that the present crisis in our community
has thrust upon them. Their coming
duties call for a basic knowledge of gen-
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eral and sociological jurisprudence, an
intimate familiarity with the law as a sci-
ence, and with its history, an ability to
distinguish in it the fundamental from
the casual, and constructive talent to en-
able them to reconcile the practical as-
pirations of social reformers with the
priceless lessons of experience from the
history of government and of law in
practical operation. How can this be
brought about? Only by broadening the
knowledgc and studies of the members
of our profession. It is they who make
the judges who contribute to their edu-
cation and who help them to just, broad,
and safe conclusions.
What we need now is to rouse our
profession to speak out. We must be
heard in defense of the good there is in
our present society, and in pointing out
the social injury which a retrograde step
may involve. But we must also put our-
selves more in touch with the present
thinking of the people who are being led
in foolish paths. We must study socio-
logical jurisprudence. We must be able
to understand the attitude of the socio-
logical reformer. We must show our
sympathy with every sincere effort to
better things.
What the people need in respect to
this matter is light, and the profession
engaged in administering law, and in
promoting just judicial conclusions, must
contribute their valuable assistance in
giving it. In so far as the conditions in
society are new, in so far as its needs are
different from what they seemed to be
at the time of the adoption of the consti-
tution, or as they were recognized under
the common law, embodied in a century
of our judicial decisions, they should be
studied by the profession. We should
seek to know exactly what are the condi-
tions that are sought to be remedied.
We should be willing to meet them in
seeking to remedy every condition that
it is possible to remedy consistently with
the maintenance of those principles that
are essential to the pursuit of material
progress and the consequent attainment
of spiritual progress in society and to
permanent popular and peaceful govern-
ment of law.
The working of the problem presented
is not the task of a year. It may require
a generation or more. We must prepare
our successors, the future American Bar,
to meet the demand.
Every law school should require those
who are to be admitted to its halls to
have a general education furnishing a
sufficiently broad foundation upon which
to base a thorough legal education. That
general education ought to include a
study of economics and a study of soci-
ology, and the curriculum of every law
school should include a close study of the
science of general and sociological juris-
prudence as a basis for the study of the
various branches of our law; and this
raising of law school standards should
meet a sympathetic response from Su-
preme Courts in requirements for admis-
sion to the Bar. Then the members of
the Bar will come to the discussion of
social remedies in courts, in the halls of
Congress, and in legislatures, and in ap-
peals to the people, properly equipped,
and will bring the controversy down to a
practical issue, and the fight can be
fought out on a common ground. The
valuable lessons of the past will be given
proper weight and real and enduring so-
cial progress will be attained. We shall
avoid, then, radical and impractical
changes in law and government by which
we might easily lose what we have gain-
ed in the struggle of mankind for better
things.
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